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3.1  Introduction 
The European Monetary System (EMS) was launched in March 1979. 
It came as a reaction  to the large fluctuations of the dollar and was 
stimulated by the belief of policy makers that the intra-European ex- 
change rate  uncertainty  was detrimental to trade and investment  in 
Europe. The primary purpose of the founders of the EMS was therefore 
to create a zone of relative exchange rate stability which, if successful, 
could contribute to better prospects for growth of income and trade in 
Europe. Moreover, it was hoped that the workings of the EMS would 
facilitate the convergence of the economies of the EEC. By doing so, 
it  would  create the necessary  conditions for further economic and 
political integration in Western Europe. 
In  this paper  we  first analyze to what extent the  EMS has been 
successful in stabilizing the exchange rates among its member curren- 
cies (section 3.2) and in avoiding the misalignments of exchange rates 
which have been prevalent outside the system (section 3.3). In section 
3.4 the salient features of the growth of trade between EMS countries 
and a group of non-EMS countries are presented. This section leaves 
us with a puzzle. Despite the relative success in stabilizing exchange 
rates, the EMS zone is faced with a slow growth of its internal trade. 
The rest of the paper is an attempt at explaining this puzzle. In order 
to do so, we specify an econometric model (section 3.6) and use it to 
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quantify the contribution of several factors in the explanation of the 
slowdown of intra-EMS trade. 
3.2  The EMS and Exchange Rate Stability 
How successful has the EMS been in reducing exchange rate vari- 
ability within the system? This question has been discussed in great 
detail in recent studies (see, e.g., Ungerer 1983, 1986, EC Commission 
1984, Rogoff  1985). The general conclusion to be drawn from these 
studies is that the EMS indeed contributed to a relative stability of the 
intra-EMS exchange rates. 
Some additional evidence on the variability of real exchange rates 
is  provided  here.  The way  we  proceed  is  to compare measures  of 
exchange rate variability of the EMS countries before and after 1979 
and inside and outside the system. 
Table 3.1  presents the standard deviations of  the monthly changes 
in the real effective exchange rates of  the EMS during  1973-78  and 
1979-86.  Tables 3.2 and 3.3 do the same for the quarterly and yearly 
changes, respectively,  in the real effective exchange rates. These ef- 
fective exchange rates were computed for each EMS country relative 
to the rest of  the EMS and relative  to a control group of  countries 
consisting of the eight major industrial countries outside the EMS (Aus- 
tria, Canada, Japan, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United States, 
and the United Kingdom). This allows us to compare the exchange rate 
variability of EMS currencies inside and outside the system. 
The results  of  table  3.1  (monthly  changes) suggest  the following 
interpretation. First, the intra-EMS effective exchange rates generally 
tend to become significantly less variable after  1979. This decline in 
intra-EMS exchange rate variability is most pronounced for the new- 
comers in  the EMS (i.e.,  those countries that  prior to  1979 did not 
participate  in  an exchange rate arrangement) and for Germany. The 
latter can be explained by the fact that a significant part of the German 
trade is with  France and  Italy,  two countries  that joined  the  EMS 
arrangement. 
Second, the variability of the exchange rates of the EMS countries 
with  the industrialized  countries outside the EMS does not change 
significantly after 1979. The exception here is Ireland, which uncoupled 
its currency from the pound  sterling when entering the EMS. Third, 
we observe that the variability of  the EMS exchange rates with the 
currencies outside the EMS is for all countries significantly higher than 
the intra-EMS variability. 
This broad picture of the short-term (monthly) exchange rate vari- 
ability can also be found in  table 3.2, which presents evidence con- 
cerning  quarterly  exchange  rate  variability.  There  is  a  difference, 79  Exchange Rate and European Monetary System 
Table 3.1  Standard Deviation of the Monthly Changes of the Real Effective 
Exchange Rates (%) 
Intra-EMS  Extra-EMS" 
1973-79b  1979-86b  1973 -79  1979-86 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Belgium  0.82  0.86  1.56  1.72 
Denmark  1.25  0.87  1.62  1.48 
Netherlands  0.99  0.73  1.83  1.81 
Ireland  2.33  1.10  1.19  1.85 
France  I .43  1.06  I .74  1.80 
Germany  I .22  0.66  I .71  1.42 
Italy  2.09  0.92  1.57  1.40 
F-tests on the ColumnsC 
Belgium  1.10  1.21  3.64'  3.97' 
Denmark  2.08'  1.20  I .69*  2.93' 
Netherlands  1.82'  1.02  3.42'  6.11' 
Ireland  4.50'  2.41'  3.80'  2.86' 
France  1.80'  1.07  I .48  2.87" 
Germany  3.38'  1.45  1.98'  4.60' 
Italy  5.13'  1.24  1.79'  2.31' 
Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics. 
"The Extra-EMS group of countries consists of Austria, Canada, Japan, Norway, Swe- 
den, Switzerland, the United States, and the United Kingdom. 
bThe  first  subperiod goes from January 1973 to February  1979, and the second from 
March 1979 to October 1986. 
=The F-statistics reported  test for the significance of  the  variances between  the two 
columns indicated. 
*p < .05. 
however. The decline in intra-EMS variability of the French franc and 
the Danish krone after  1979 seems to be insignificant on a quarterly 
basis. 
When looking at the standard deviation of yearly changes of the real 
effective exchange rates in table 3.3, we even observe an increase in 
the intra-EMS variability after 1979 for the Belgian franc, the Danish 
krone and the deutsche mark (DM). The limited degrees of freedom 
however, prevent formal F-tests on the significance of these increases. 
A comparison of the monthly, quarterly, and yearly changes in the 
real effective rates suggests that the decline in  intra-EMS variability 
has been somewhat more significant at the short end. It is nevertheless 
fair to conclude that  the EMS has  succeeded  in  creating a zone of 
relative exchange rate stability in Europe. 80  Paul De Grsuwe/Guy Verfaille 
Table 3.2  Standard Deviation of the Quarterly Changes of the Real Effective 
Exchange Rates (%) 
Intra-EMS  Extra-EMSd 
1 973-78h 
(1) 
1979-86h  1973-78  1979-86 
(2)  (3)  (4) 
Belgium  1.25 
Denmark  1.61 
Netherlands  1.68 
Ireland  4.21 
France  2.40 
Italy  3.51 
Germany  2.20 
1.24  2.87  3.11 
1.28  2.27  2.60 
1.20  3.02  3.48 
1.84  2.40  3.63 
2.03  2.63  3.04 
1.17  3.06  2.73 
1.47  2.61  2.56 
Belgium  0.99  1.17  5.29"  6.25' 
Denmark  1.58  1.31  1.99  4.12' 
Netherlands  1.96'  I .32  3.25'  8.41' 
Ireland  5.23*  2.29-  3.08'  3.89' 
France  1.40  1.34  1.20  2.25" 
Italy  5.73'  I .04  1.81  3.06' 
Source: International  Monetary  Fund, International  Financial Statistics. 
"See note a  of table 3. I. 
bThe first subperiod goes from 1973:Il to 1978:IV, and the second from 1979:I to 1986:III. 
=See  note c of table 3.1. 
Germany  3.51'  1.25  1.94  5.44' 
3.3  The EMS and Misalignment 
Another way to evaluate the performance of the EMS in  stabilizing 
exchange rates is to compare measures of  misalignment within and 
outside the EMS. This is done in this section. At first, however, the 
equilibrium rate that will be used as a reference for the calculations of 
misalignment needs to be defined. There are several possible ways to 
calculate an equilibrium exchange rate. One has been made popular in 
recent years by Williamson.*  In this view the "fundamental equilibrium 
exchange rate"  is the real exchange rate leading (over the cycle) to a 
current account balance which is sustainable given the long-run equi- 
librium capital movements. An alternative and computationally easier 
way is to calculate purchasing power parity (PPP) rates and correct 
them for productivity  differences between countrie~.~  Here we used 
the latter approach. As derived more formally in appendix A, we can 
write the measure of  misalignment M as: 81  Exchange Rate and European Monetary System 
Table 3.3  Standard Deviation of the Yearly Changes of the Real Effective 
Exchange Rates (70) 
Intra-EMS  Extra-EMSa 
1974-7gb  1980-86b  1974-78  1980-86 
(1)’  (2)’  (3)=  (4)’ 
Belgium  2.58  3.66  5.24  7.61 
Denmark  2.77  3.47  3.25  4.80 
Netherlands  3.63  2.84  4.91  8.88 
Ireland  7.63  3.28  4.34  7.09 
France  5.02  4.78  5.06  6.52 
Germany  3.01  3.46  4.31  7.70 
Italy  5.14  2.84  5.02  6.53 
Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics. 
“See note a of table 3.1. 
bThe first subperiod goes from January 1974 to February  1979, and the second from 
March 1980 to October 1986. These subperiods were chosen since monthly observations 
of  12-month changes are considered and we didn’t want to mix periods with different 
exchange rate regimes. 
CThe  limited number of independent observations did not allow us to perform the same 
kind of F-tests as in tables 3.1 and 3.2. 
M  = s + P,* - P,  + (1 - a)(q - q*) 
where M = misalignment of the exchange rate (%) 
S  = log of  the nominal exchange rate 
P, = log of the general price index 
q  = log of the productivity level in the tradables sector 
a  = share of  traded goods in the consumption basket 
*  refers to a variable of  the foreign country. 
A common problem with PPP-based calculations like these is the proper 
choice of the base period. To  minimize distortions from choosing a 
particular year, we have taken the average over 1974-85 as constituting 
the equilibrium value. 
In figures 3.1 to 3.7 we present  the misalignment of  a number of 
currencies against non-EMS currencies and against EMS currencies. 
These misalignments are calculated using measures of  effective ex- 
change rates. To  take an example: figure 3.1 indicates that in  1985 the 
DM  was overvalued (on average) against  the other EMS currencies 
and undervalued against the group of  non-EMS currencies. 
On the whole, the evidence indicates that although misalignments 
were also present among the EMS currencies, they seem to have been 
smaller than those between currencies which were not explicitly linked 
through an exchange-rate agreement. More evidence is shown in table 
3.4, This table concentrates on the period in  which the EMS was in 82  Paul De Grauwe/Guy Verfaille 
Table 3.4  Maximum Misalignment (in Either Direction) during the Period 
1979-85  (YO) 




























effect.  It presents the maximum misalignment  of the effective rates 
during 1979-85.  We observe that the EMS currencies always recorded 
the  highest  misalignment  with  respect  to  the  group  of  non-EMS 
currencies. 
3.4  The EMS and Trade 
One of the striking phenomena concerning the growth of trade within 
the EMS is its sluggishness since 1979. The evidence is summarized 
in figure 3.8. It shows the average yearly growth of  intra-EMS trade 
during  1973-78  and 1979-85  and compares this with  the growth of 
trade (export + import) of  the EMS countries with the non-EMS in- 
dustrialized countries during the same two periods. 
Two observations can be made from the evidence of figure 3.8. First, 
the yearly growth of  the intra-EMS  trade declined on average from 
4.44% in 1973-78 to 2.74% in 1979-85.  The trade of the EMS countries 
with  the non-EMS  industrial countries does not seem to have been 
subjected  to the same deceleration.  As  this  trade might  have  been 
affected by the large movements of the dollar, we also show the growth 
rates of the trade of the EMS with the non-EMS group, excluding the 
United States. Although we observe a somewhat larger deceleration, 
it is nevertheless a less pronounced slowdown than the one observed 
within the EMS.4 
Second, during both the pre-EMS and the post-EMS  periods, the 
average growth of the intra-EMS trade was substantially lower than 
the average growth of the trade of  the EMS countries with the non- 
EMS industrialized countries. Thus, the intra-EMS trade flows contin- 
ued to grow at about half the rate of the trade between EMS and non- 
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Fig. 3.1  Misalignment of the DM versus EMS and non-EMS curren- 
cies (+ = undervaluation of the DM). 
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Fig. 3.2  Misalignment of the lira versus EMS and non-EMS curren- 
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Fig. 3.3  Misalignment of the French franc versus EMS  and non-EMS 
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Fig. 3.4  Misalignment of the Belgian franc versus EMS and non-EMS 
currencies (+ = undervaluation of the Belgian franc). 85  Exchange Rate and European Monetary System 
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Fig. 3.5  Misalignment of  the pound  sterling versus  EMS and non- 
EMS currencies (+ = undervaluation of the pound). 
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Fig. 3.6  Misalignment of the U.S. dollar versus EMS and non-EMS 
currencies (+ = undervaluation of the dollar). 86  Paul De GrauwelGuy Verfaille 
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Fig. 3.7  Misalignment of  the yen versus EMS and non-EMS curren- 











Intro-EMS  EMS-Non EMS EMS-NcmEMS  lntro 
excl. US  Non-EMS 
3.8  Average yearly growth of trade (export + import) in constant 
prices  (in  percentages).  Source:  IMF, Direction of  Trade; 
IMF, International Financial Statistics. Notes:  1. The group 
of  non-EMS  industrialized  countries  consists of  Austria, 
Canada, Japan, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the U.K., 
and the U.S.  2.  The export figures of  each country were 
deflated by the index of export unit values of the same coun- 
try; in order to obtain import figures in constant prices we 
used export unit values of  the different countries of  origin 
of these imports and weighted these indices using the share 
of  each exporting country in the total  imports. The trade 
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Fig. 3.9  Average yearly growth of exports in constant prices (in per- 
centages) 1979-85.  Source: IMF, Direction of Trade; IMF, 
International Financial Statistics. Notes:  1.  The group of non- 
EMS countries consists of Austria, Canada, Japan, Norway, 
Sweden, Switzerland, the U.S.,  and the U.K. 2. The export 
figures of each country were deflated by the index of export 
unit values of the same country. 
inside the EMS. Figure 3.9 presents  some additional evidence about 
these trade flows in the post-1979 period. Whereas the intra-EMS ex- 
ports grew at an annual rate of 2.79%, the exports from the EMS to 
the rest of the industrial countries and the exports between the non- 
EMS countries grew at more than twice this rate. Even the exports 
from the non-EMS to the EMS grew substantially faster than the intra- 
EMS exports. This is surprising, since these export flows also include 
the exports of the United States to the EMS, which were hampered 
by the significant appreciation of the dollar during the period. 
It is clear that there is a puzzle  to explain. On the one hand, the 
EMS has been successful in avoiding the high variability of exchange 
rates observed outside the system. On the other hand, it has not only 
experienced a slowdown of its internal trade, but the intra-EMS trade 
now grows at a substantially slower pace than that in the rest of the 
industrialized world. These phenomena raise a number of issues. First, 
there is the question of how exchange rate variability affects interna- 
tional trade flows. Second, if it can be established that exchange rate 
stability fosters trade, how important is this effect? The evidence of 
the EMS indicates that if exchange rate stability has a positive effect, 
it must have been swamped by other variables which negatively affected 
intra-EMS trade. What are these variables? And how important have 
they been? These are some of the questions we intend to answer in 
the following sections. As we are primarily interested in the possible 
effects of the EMS arrangement on trade among its members, we limit 
the empirical work to the period  1979-85.  This of course prevents us 
from analyzing why intra-EMS trade has decelerated after 1979, but 88  Paul De Grauwe/Guy Verfaille 
allows us to focus on the difference in trade growth during the period 
in which the EMS was in effe~t.~ 
3.5  Exchange Rate Variability  and International Trade 
Exchange rate variability can affect the growth rate of international 
trade in several ways. One has to do with the effects of exchange risk 
on international trade. The other could be labeled the political economy 
of misaligned exchange rates. 
According to the traditional analysis of behavior under risk, an in- 
crease in risk will lead risk-averse individuals to reduce their efforts 
in  the risky  activity and to concentrate their  energies in  less risky 
endeavors (given an unchanged return). This theory has led many to 
conclude that by increasing the risk of international trade activities, 
the exchange rate volatility must in principle have a negative effect on 
trade. In this view, exchange rate volatility leads economic agents to 
a retrenchment into domestic activities.6 The empirical evidence of the 
models based on this theory has up until now not been very convincing 
about the significance of the negative effects of exchange rate risk on 
international trade. 
There is another strand of  literature which analyzes the effects of 
exchange rate variability on international trade and which appears to 
come to more clear-cut results about this relationship. One can call 
this literature the “political economy of exchange rate variability.” 
Although this literature is far removed from the level of formalization 
which is found in the pure theory of risk, it is important to look at the 
problem from the political economy perspective.  We  can summarize 
the main ideas as follows. Exchange rate changes which wander away 
from purchasing power parities (or more generally from their equilib- 
rium values) lead to adjustment problems  and  “real”  effects on the 
economy. These misalignments lead to a boom  in  the traded goods 
sectors of the countries whose currency has become undervalued. In 
the countries with overvalued currencies as a result of these swings in 
the real exchange rate, the traded goods sector is squeezed. This leads 
to a loss of output and employment which is not easily absorbed in the 
short run by the other sectors in the economy. 
The political economy part of  this story is set in motion when, as 
a result of output and employment losses, individuals hurt by these 
developments  organize  themselves to pass  protectionist  legislation. 
These protectionist measures can take a variety of forms; from import 
tariffs and quantitative restrictions to very subtle ways of subsidizing 
exporting and import-competing industries.’  As a result, markets be- 
come  more  protected,  such  that  international  trade  is  negatively 
affected. 89  Exchange Rate and European Monetary System 
This hypothesis only makes sense if there is some asymmetry in the 
protectionist tendencies.  It must  be that the protectionist  legislation 
passed when the currency tended to be overvalued is not easily scrapped 
when the currency is in the undervaluation cycle. If such asymmetries 
are present, then the swings in  the real exchange rates will lead to a 
trendlike increase in protectionism and will negatively affect interna- 
tional trade. Thus, this theory predicts that the volatility of real ex- 
change rates over periods exceeding a few months or quarters is likely 
to lead to a reduction in the growth of international trade. 
The political economy theory  of the effects of  misalignment  also 
suggests a way in which in  the empirical work a distinction can be 
made between the effect of changes in competitiveness and the effects 
of misalignment. The influence of misalignment can be introduced into 
the model through the inclusion of an indicator of “protectionist pres- 
sure stemming from misalignment.” 
In section 3.6 we present an econometric model which aims at quan- 
tifying the effects of exchange risk and misalignment. In addition, the 
model will allow us to separate these effects from the effects of other 
variables  like the growth of income and relative price changes. The 
empirical results will enable us to shed some light on the puzzle of why 
intra-EMS trade was growing more slowly than other trade flows after 
1979. 
3.6  The  Econometric Model 
In order to specify the empirical model, we rely on what standard 
trade theory tells us about the determinants of international trade flows. 
Let us start from the following general equation: 
(1)  X..  IJ  = flu,,  Y;,  R,,  Tij,  S,,  Mij). 
The growth of exports of country i to countryj  (X,> is a positive function 
of the growth of demand in countryj as measured by the real income 
of that country (5).  It is a positive function of the growth of the supply 
possibilities of the exporting country. This is measured by the growth 
rate of output of country  i (YJ.  The growth of the exports of country 
i to countryj  is a positive function of the change in  the bilateral real 
exchange rate (Rij).  A real depreciation of the currency of the exporting 
country i will increase its exports to countryj. 
The growth of trade between countries  i andj  is also influenced by 
the nature of the trade arrangements between the two countries (Tij). 
In particular, if  countries i and j form a customs union, this should 
increase their bilateral trade flows relative to the trade with third coun- 
tries. We  will use this variable to measure the effect of the trade ar- 
rangements between the EEC countries in the sample. In the empirical 90  Paul De GrauwelGuy Verfaille 
analysis we will further isolate the trade flows among the original EEC 
members (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands) from 
the other intra-EEC flows. In this way we can catch differences in the 
phases of the integration process. 
In equation (1) we also include a measure of exchange rate variability 
(Sjj).  We  expect that this variable negatively affects trade flows between 
countries i andj. In contrast to most of the empirical literature on the 
effect of exchange rate volatility on international trade, we will use a 
measure of long-term (yearly) variability of the real exchange rate. 
Finally, we add the variable M,. This is our indicator of protectionist 
pressure in countryj  (induced by a sustained overvaluation of the cur- 
rency of countryj) against imports from country i.  Thus this variable 
measures the negative effect of past and current misalignments on bi- 
lateral exports. It is calculated as the cumulative percentage overval- 
uation  of  the  currency  of  the  importing  country  relative  to  the 
productivity-adjusted bilateral real exchange rate (for more details see 
appendix A). One way to interpret this variable is as follows: misalign- 
ments (overvaluations of the currency) which have occurred in the past 
affect today’s trade flows by the protectionist measures they have set in 
motion. 
3.7  The Empirical Results 
A cross-section analysis was performed on the average yearly change 
of the volume of  exports during the period  1979-85.  The sample in- 
cluded the bilateral exports of  15 industrial countries which together 
constitute more than 90% of trade among industrial countries.8 In total 
we thus have a sample of  210 bilateral export flows. A detailed de- 
scription of the data can be found in appendix B. Two further remarks 
should be made here. The first concerns the way the variable  M, is 
calculated. It is calculated over the whole floating-rate period 1974-85 
and not over the period 1979-85 as the other variables are. The reason 
is that we assume that protectionist pressure built up before 1979 will 
still influence trade flows during  1979-85.  The second remark deals 
with the way the effects of trade arrangements between countries (T,) 
are introduced. Integration effects are assumed to work through higher 
income elasticities on the import side. The same increase in the income 
of the importing country belonging to a trade arrangement such as the 
EEC is expected to have a greater effect on the exports of the partners 
than those of other co~ntries.~  The results of the estimation of equation 
(1) are shown in table 3.5. 
These empirical results suggest the following interpretation.  First, 
the demand and supply variables as measured by the changes in the 
income of the importing and the exporting country have the expected 91  Exchange Rate and European Monetary System 
Table 3.5  Estimation Results, with Average Real Change in Exports, 1979- 



































































Note:  Yi  = average yearly change in income exporting country;  = average yearly 
change in income importing country; OLD = dummy which takes the value of  1  for 
flows among the 5 original members of the EEC in the sample; NEW = dummy which 
takes the value of  I  for intra-EEC flows involving the U.K.,  Ireland, and Denmark; 
RU = average annual rate of  real  depreciation of  the exporting country’s  currency; 
Sy  = real exchange rate variability, measured as the variance of the annual changes of 
the real exchange rate: MU = indicator of  protectionist pressure created by exchange 
rate misalignment. r-statistics in parentheses. *p < .05. **p < .01. 
positive and significant effect on bilateral export flows. Second, inte- 
gration effects are positive and significant. They are more pronounced 
for the EMS trade with the new members of the EEC. The variable 
measuring the integration effects among the old EEC countries is less 
pronounced and often insignificant. This suggests that for the trade 
among these old EEC members some saturation effect is present. Third, 
changes in  relative prices have the expected positive effect, that is, a 
real depreciation of currency i leads to an increase of  the exports of 
country  i.  This effect, however, is usually not  significant (except in 
equation la in table 3.5). 
When the exchange rate variability (Sij)  and the indicator of protec- 
tionist pressure created by misalignment (Mij)  are entered separately 
into the equation (eqs. la and lb in table 3.3, they show up with a 
significant negative coefficient. When entered simultaneously into the 
equation, the misalignment variable looses its significance (eq.  Ic in 92  Paul De Grauwe/Guy Verfaille 
table 3.5). The F-statistics reported at the bottom of table 3.5 indicate 
that variability and/or misalignment contribute significantly to the ex- 
planation of the change in bilateral exports. 
Our finding that exchange rate variability has a significant negative 
effect on exports contradicts earlier findings by Hooper and Kohlhagen 
(1978), Gotur (1985),  Bailey et al. (1986), and IMF (1984). It is, however, 
consistent with the results of Cushman (1983, 1986), Abrams (1980), 
and Thursby and Thursby (1985). The evidence on the effect of  mis- 
alignment is not that clear-cut. Table 3.5 would suggest that the mis- 
alignment variable is overshadowed by the variable measuring yearly 
variability of  exchange rates when entered simultaneously. This lack 
of precision of the misalignment variable may be due to the high cor- 
relation with the variable measuring exchange rate variability. 
We  have observed in this section that exchange rate variability and 
misalignment have a negative effect on international trade. The question 
remains, however, whether this effect is also economically important. 
We  analyze this question in section 3.8. 
3.8  Real Growth of Exports 
In figures 3.8 and 3.9 it was illustrated that after 1979 trade flows 
among the EMS members were growing much more slowly compared 
with other trade flows. In this section we use the empirical results of 
section  3.7 to quantify the contribution of different  variables in  the 
explanation of this phenomenon. 
The calculations were made using the estimated coefficients of equa- 
tion (lc) in table 3.5. Using the average values of the independent vari- 
ables for each group of countries, we calculated their contribution to the 
actual growth rate of exports. The results are presented in table 3.6. 
Table 3.6  Contribution to the Real Growth Rate of Exports (1979-85) 
Exports 
~ 
EMS  EMS  Non-EMS  Non-EMS 
EMS  Non-EMS  EMS  Non-EMS 
to  to  to  to 
Income  2.28  10.60  10.67  11.83 
Misalignment  -0.50  -  2.21  -2.16  -  1.53 
Variability  -0.68  -  8.05  -  10.34  -9.18 
prices  0.0  1.11  -  1.43  0.0 
Relative 
Other  1.69  5.61  7.20  5.02 
Total  2.79  7.06  3.94  6.14 93  Exchange Rate and European Monetary System 
The totals of the columns of table 3.6 give the observed real growth 
rate of exports between the groups of countries during 1979-85.  These 
figures correspond to the ones in figure 3.8. The entries in table 3.6 
give the effects of  the different explanatory variables on the growth 
rate of exports. They should be interpreted as follows. Changes in the 
income of the EMS countries were responsible for 2.28% of the 2.79% 
growth in intra-EMS exports. (Note that this includes the effect of the 
higher income sensitivity of intra-EMS trade, due to the higher level 
of trade integration.) Protectionist pressure as a result of misalignment 
slowed the growth of intra-EMS trade by 0.50%, while exchange rate 
variability reduced that growth rate by another 0.68%. 
We  can conclude from table 3.6 that income and exchange rate vari- 
ability are certainly the most important factors in explaining the growth 
of exports. Misalignment and changes in relative prices seem to play a 
secondary role. The question remains now to what extent divergent evo- 
lutions of these variables can account for the difference in growth rate 
after 1979 between intra-EMS exports and other export flows. In order 
to answer this question, we performed some simulation experiments. 
3.9  Some Simulation Results 
In this section we report the results of three simulation experiments. 
The purpose is to write an “anti-histoire” of what would have happened 
to intra-EMS exports if  conditions had been different. The results of 
the simulations are summarized in table 3.7. The base line is the actual 
real growth rate of exports between the groups of countries. 
Case 1 
In this simulation experiment we assumed that the average real growth 
rate of income in the EMS was the same as the one observed for the 
group of countries outside the EMS.  lo The growth of intra-EMS exports 
increases by  1.44% relative to the observed value. Thus if  the EMS 
countries had managed to grow at the (higher) rate observed outside 
Table 3.7  Simulation Results: Real Growth of  Exports (1979-85)  (%) 
Exports 
EMS  EMS  Non-EMS  Non-EMS 
EMS  Non-EMS  EMS  Non-EMS 
to  to  to  to 
Base  2.79  7.06  3.94  6.14 
Case 1  4.23  8.10  9.00  6.14 
Case 2  0.38  7.06  3.94  6.14 
Case 3  2.02  7.83  4.79  6.19 94  Paul De GrauwelGuy Verfaille 
the EMS, their trade would have grown on average by 4.23% per year 
instead of only 2.79%. In addition, the growth rate of their imports 
from the non-EMS area would have been more than twice as high as 
in the base value. Thus, it appears that the slow growth of GDP ob- 
served within the EMS is an important variable in the explanation of 
the low intra-EMS growth of trade. It is, however, insufficient to explain 
the full extent of the sluggish intra-EMS trade. Even when we assume, 
as we do in this simulation, that the EMS GDP would have grown at 
the higher (non-EMS) rate, the resulting growth of  trade within the 
EMS falls short of the one we observe outside the EMS. 
Case 2 
In order to have an idea of the beneficial effects of the EMS as a 
stabilizer of the bilateral exchange rates, we performed the following 
experiment. We  calculated the growth rate of exports assuming that 
inside the EMS we would have had the same degree of exchange rate 
variability and misalignment as among the non-EMS  countries. The 
results in table 3.7 indicate that intra-EMS export growth would have 
dropped by 2.41%, from 2.79%  to 0.38%. This 2.41% growth of exports 
can be interpreted as the beneficial effect of the exchange rate arrange- 
ment of the EMS on the trade flows among its members. This exper- 
iment suggests that through the exchange rate stability it provided, the 
EMS was successful in preventing an even more unfavorable evolution 
in its internal trade than the one we observed. 
It should be stressed that these experiments are somewhat artificial. 
We  cannot exclude, for example, that the low growth of GDP and the 
low variability of exchange rates are correlated. If this is the case, one 
could also argue that the EMS contributed to both low growth and low 
exchange rate variability. The present partial equilibrium exercise does 
not allow us to resolve this issue. 
Case 3 
In this third experiment we calculate what would have happened if 
the variability of  the real exchange rates during the period  1979-85 
had been the same as during the period  1974-78.  The growth rate of 
intra-EMS exports would have been somewhat lower, while the other 
trade flows would have grown faster. The difference however, is not 
very  large.  These results  reflect the fact that  after  1979, long-term 
exchange rate variability has on average slightly decreased among EMS 
members,  while it  has increased  somewhat outside the EMS when 
compared to the period 1974-78. 
From the preceding experiments we can conclude that the low growth 
of GDP within the EMS explains a substantial part of the low growth of 
trade within the EMS since 1979. However, this negative growth effect 
was completely offset by a favorable effect resulting from the relative 95  Exchange Rate and European Monetary System 
exchange rate stability within the EMS. We  are back at square one. Where 
does the observed decline in the growth rate of intra-EMS trade come 
from? 
The answer must be sought in the slowdown of the trade integration 
process within the old EEC countries, which comprise the EMS coun- 
tries. To illustrate this, we calculated the implied income elasticities of 
export demand (using the results of equation [lc] in table 3.5). For the 
trade among the original members of  the EEC, this elasticity is 0.91. 
This is much lower than the one for the intra-EEC trade involving the 
United Kingdom, Denmark, and Ireland (4.10) and the one for all trade 
flows involving countries outside the EEC (2.31).  These figures indicate 
that the trade integration  process  within the group of original EEC 
members has leveled off. Outside this old EEC zone, however, there 
is still a substantial trade integration momentum. The latter has been 
operating strongly enough to overcome the negative effects of exchange 
rate variability. 
This evidence about new trade integration  patterns has also been 
documented in the more disaggregated studies of Jacquemin and Sapir 
(1986, 1987)."  In these studies it was found that the EEC countries' 
trade with non-EEC countries has been expanding much faster than 
the intra-EEC trade since the early eighties. These new trade integra- 
tion processes are the result  of  the internationalization of European 
industries on a worldwide scale. They also explain a slowdown of the 
growth rates of traditional intra-EEC trade. 
3.10  Conclusion 
One of the objectives of the EMS was to create a zone of monetary 
stability in Europe. If we measure monetary stability by the variability 
of the exchange rates, it can certainly be said that the EMS was a 
success.  In general, the intra-EMS exchange rates tended to be less 
variable and less prone to large misalignments than the exchange rates 
of currencies outside the system. 
Despite the relative stability of intra-EMS exchange rates, the intra- 
EMS trade grew at a substantially lower pace than in the rest of the 
industrialized  world.  In  addition, the EMS trade (both exports and 
imports) with the rest of the industrialized world increased significantly 
faster than the intra-EMS trade. This is certainly a puzzling phenom- 
enon. The founding fathers of the EMS expected that a low exchange 
rate variability would boost internal EMS trade. 
In this paper we have tried to explain this phenomenon. Our main 
findings are that the slowdown of the growth of GDP in the EMS, which 
was much  larger than  in  the  rest  of  the  industrialized  world,  is an 
important explanatory variable. However, we also found that the low 
growth of GDP explains less than half  of the slow intra-EMS trade. 96  Paul De Grauwe/Guy Verfaille 
The other unexplained part was interpreted as reflecting the slowdown 
in the trade integration process of the EMS countries, which all (except 
Ireland and Denmark) belong to the original EEC. 
Our second  main finding is that  the low exchange rate  variability 
contributed positively towards the intra-EMS trade. In other words, 
in a different (more variable) exchange rate regime, the EMS  countries 
would probably  have experienced an even larger  slowdown of  their 
internal trade than the one observed during the 1979-85  period. This 
positive  effect  of  the relative  stability of  exchange rates within  the 
EMS, however, has not been strong enough to overcome the combined 
negative growth effect and the negative effect coming from the slow- 
down of the trade integration process in the EEC  countries. 
One unresolved  issue of this empirical analysis has to do with the 
question whether the EMS arrangement might have induced both low 
exchange rate  variability and low growth of output. The latter may 
have occurred if  the EMS arrangement forced the participating coun- 
tries to follow a more deflationary demand policy than in a different 
exchange rate arrangement. If this is the case, the success of the EMS 
is less obvious. 
Notes 
1.  It  should be stressed here that we  have looked  only at measures of  ex 
post  (unconditional) variability.  Better measures of  risk  involve the compu- 
tation  of  ex  ante (conditional) variability.  The evidence using  measures of 
unconditional  variability,  however,  leads to conclusions similar  to the ones 
arrived at here (see Rogoff 1985). 
2. See Williamson (1985). 
3. There is a large literature  on this topic.  See Balassa (1964), Kravis and 
Lipsey (1986), and Marston (1986). 
4. It should be noted that the appreciation of the dollar during the first part 
of the eighties stimulated export flows from the EMS to the United States, but 
discouraged export flows from the United States to the EMS. The two effects 
tend to cancel out in the data presented  in figure 3.8. 
5. For an analysis of the factors which explain the slowdown of the intra- 
EMS trade since 1979, see P.  De Grauwe (1987b). 
6.  A  representative study  is  Hooper and  Kohlhagen  (1978). It  should  be 
stressed here, however, that the negative effect of  exchange risk on trade is 
derived by making relatively restrictive assumptions about the utility function. 
In a more general setup with less restrictive  assumptions about the shape of 
the utility function, it is generally not possible to derive such a clear-cut con- 
clusion about the effect of risk on trade. See Newbery and Stiglitz (1981); see 
also De Grauwe (1987a). 
7. These subsidies can take a more direct form of employment  subsidies, 
cheap loans, or government participation  or can be much more disguised as 
safety regulations, technical standards, and so on. 97  Exchange Rate and European Monetary System 
8. The group of  15 countries comprises the 7 members participating  in the 
exchange rate mechanism of the EMS (Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, 
Ireland, Italy, and the Netherlands) and the same group of 8 countries outside 
the exchange rate agreement as in section 3.2  (Austria, Canada, Japan, Norway, 
Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States). 
9. In earlier experiments we also allowed for different income elasticities for 
trade among members of  the EFTA in the sample (Austria, Norway, and Swe- 
den). Since no  significant difference  was found, however,  we  dropped this 
complication. 
10. The actual average growth rate of GDP in the EMS during that period 
was 1.51% as opposed to 2.50% in the group of non-EMS countries. 
11. See also P.  De Grauwe (1987b) and P.  De Grauwe and B.  de Bellefroid 
(1987). 
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Appendix A 
Measures of  Misalignment 
1.  Calculating the Equilibrium Rate 
logs) as : 
(1) 
where P,  = price index of traded goods 
The general price index P, of the home country can be written (in 
P,. = UP, + (1 - u)P, 
P, = price index of nontraded goods 
a  = share of traded goods in the consumption basket. 
Analogously, we have for the foreign country: 
(2) 
Assuming we can write prices as a function of wages and productivity 
in the tradables and nontradables sector, we have: 
(3) 
where w,  w*  = the general wage index in the domestic 
P,* = u*P,* + (1 -  U*)P,*. 
P,=w-q  P,=w-v 
p,* = w*  - q*  p  *  = w*  -  v* 
and the foreign country, respectively 
q, q*  = the (log of the) productivity levels in the tradables 
sector in the two countries 
v,  v*  = the (log of the) productivity levels in the 
nontradables sector in the two countries. 99  Exchange Rate and European Monetary System 
Substituting eq. (3) into (1) and (2) yields, after rearranging: 
(4) 
If  PPP holds for the tradable goods, we have: 
(5) 
where Sppp  is the spot exchange rate when PPP  holds. 
If we furthermore assume that consumption patterns are the same 
in both countries (a = a*)  and productivity in the nontradables sector 
is the same (v  = v*), we can write 
(6) 
Solving for Sppp,  the productivity-adjusted PPP  rate can be written as: 
(7) 
2. Calculating Misalignment 
Misalignment is equal to the difference between the log of the actual 
spot rate and Sppp.  The share of traded goods in the consumption basket 
a, was set equal to 0.7. Productivity in the traded goods sector q was 
proxied by the real value added per person employed in the manufac- 
turing sector (Source: OECDj. Wholesale prices are used as the general 
price index. All series are on the basis average 1974-85  = 100. 
3. Comparison with Williamson (1985) 
dollar exchange rates with the estimates of Williamson (1985). 
P,. = UP,  + (1 - a)(P, + q - v) 
P,* = a*p; + (1 -  a*)(P,*  + q* -  v*). 
P,  = sppp + P,* 
P, - P,* = aSPPP + (1 -  a)(SPPP + q - q*j. 
sppp = (P,  - P,*)  - (1 - a)(q - q*). 
It is interesting to compare our estimates of misalignment for selected 
Authors’  Williamson 
(%)  (%o) 
March 83  Dec. 84  Dec. 85  1983:I  1984:IV 
DM  7.8  32.5  10.8  18  50 
Yen  11.0  22.7  9.1  15  24 
PS  13.7  31.4  7.4  3  25 
FF  18.8  33.3  15.2  17  44 
Though the estimates are not equal, they tend to go in the same direction. 
4. Measure of  Protectionist Pressure 
Our measure of protectionist pressure Mil used in the empirical anal- 
ysis is equal to the cumulative sum of the monthly percentage over- 
valuation of the currency of the importing country with respect to that 
of the exporter. Because of the asymmetry referred to in the text, the 100  Paul De Grauwe/Guy Verfaille 
observations where the currency of the importer is undervalued were 
set to zero. The larger the overvaluation of  the importer’s currency 
and the longer the overvaluation lasts, the larger Mij will be. 
Appendix B 
Data Sources 
Yi  =  Average yearly change in GDP of  country  i during the period 
1979-85  (in millions of 1980 dollars). 
Source: OECD Main Economic Indicators. 
Deflated by export unit values (IFS, line 74d). 
Source: IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics. 
R, = Average yearly percentage change in the real exchange rate. R, 
is positive when the exporter’s currency depreciates in real terms 
with respect to the currency of the importing country. It is cal- 
culated as log E, - log E,-  l*, where the real exchange rate E is 
calculated using monthly data on wholesale prices and nominal 
exchange rates from IFS, lines RF and 63. 
S, = Variance of  R, during the period 1979-85. 
X, = Average yearly change in the exports of country i to countryj. 
Comment  Jacques Melitz 
Much of the recent analysis of the European Monetary System (EMS) 
has concerned the strategic implications of the system in modifying the 
macroeconomic policy choices of the participating members. De Grauwe 
and Verfaille do us a service by  reminding us that, quite apart from 
the latter  sorts of  considerations,  the  system  was also intended  to 
promote trade. From this last perspective, the performance of the sys- 
tem  has  been  uneven,  as the two point  out. The EMS has indeed 
succeeded in stabilizing the terms of trade. But to all appearances, the 
system has not promoted  trade. Growth of internal trade within the 
EMS in 1979-86 slipped significantly below 1974-78 levels. In addition, 
the growth of trade between the members was far lower than that of 
their trade with nonmembers in the OECD (Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development) in  1979-86.  The authors offer some 
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Etudes Economiques, Paris, France, and Professor at the lnstitut des Etudes Politiques, 
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answers to this puzzle, though they do not pretend their answers are 
complete. 
They  indicate that the  stability  of  the terms of  trade  has  indeed 
promoted trade. However, slower economic growth of the EMS mem- 
bers as compared to the other major industrialized  countries in  the 
West worked toward a slowdown of  the growth of trade. This lower 
growth has also seemingly damaged internal trade between the mem- 
bers more than external trade with the rest. Additionally, the authors 
suggest that the trade-integration effects of membership in the Euro- 
pean Community (EC) diminished in 1979-85. This would also account 
for a reduction in the growth of trade between the members, since the 
only member who is also a newcomer to the EC is Ireland. 
This general reconciliation of  the evidence, it may be noted, would 
seem to place the EMS in a favorable light. This bears emphasis, since 
in the past De Grauwe has been one of the EMS’S staunchest critics.’ 
He may wish to remind us, though, that  the  EMS could be largely 
responsible for its own lower economic growth, as he also argues in 
the paper. This view would be based on the sort of strategic consid- 
erations to which I alluded at the beginning. That is, membership could 
have led to more anti-inflationary policies because of a tendency  to 
follow the German example of a strong preoccupation with inflation. 
This would mean, naturally, that the EMS has not been as advantageous 
to the non-German members than it might otherwise seem, or  more 
precisely,  that the advantages to the others would depend  on their 
sharing of the German anti-inflationary priorities. 
However, as for the empirical work,  I believe that three sorts of 
improvements could be made. First, the authors might abandon their 
measure of the annual volatility of the terms of trade in favor of either 
their monthly or their quarterly measure. Their annual measure is faulted 
by  the use  of  overlapping  observations.  It is based  on consecutive 
monthly observations of annual changes. Obviously this use of monthly 
data multiplies the data, but without adding any independent obser- 
vations. Thus, it cannot serve to measure annual volatility properly. 
The authors recognize this implicitly when they acknowledge that the 
F-statistic can tell them nothing about the reliability of  their annual 
volatility measure. But by the same token, they should have recognized 
that the measure should be scrapped as insignificant, whereas they use 
it to test in their econometric work. It is impossible to find the annual 
volatility of anything over two years simply by multiplying the number 
of annual observations within the same two-year stretch. 
1.  See Paul  De Grauwe, Should the  United  Kingdom join  the  EMS?  In  House of 
Commons, Treasury and Civil  Service Committee, The financial and economic conse- 
quences of UK  membership of the European Communities, Memoranda on the European 
Monetaty System. London: HMSO (1985),  pp. 5-  11. 102  Paul De GrauweIGuy Verfaille 
The second problem is that the authors improperly limit their sta- 
tistical analysis  to the period  1979 to  1985, while they  should  have 
begun earlier, in  1974, since their empirical discussion calls for it. By 
limiting themselves to 1979-85, they cannot really explain the puzzling 
reduction in the growth of internal trade in the EMS from 1974-78  to 
1979-85  to which they call our attention.  This they  recognize.  But 
there is a similar problem hounding their efforts to explain the stronger 
reduction in  the growth of  internal  than external trade in  the EMS 
based  on the diminution  of  the trade-integrating effects of  the EC. 
How can we be sure that the trade-integrating effects of membership 
even fell off  in  1979-85  if  we do not look at the earlier period? De 
Grauwe and Verfaille attempt to answer this objection by referring to 
independent evidence from Jacquemin and Sapir that trade integration 
has fallen off  since the beginning of the EC. But surely this will not 
do in the context of an effort to provide a quantitative assessment of 
the significance of  different factors. The only indication of a drop in 
the trade-integrating effects of  EC membership that emerges in their 
own work, as such, is the estimate that the output elasticity of the 
demand  for EMS exports by  the  newer  EC  members-the  United 
Kingdom,  Ireland,  and  Denmark-was  higher  in  1979-85  than  this 
elasticity of demand by the older members. This is admittedly sugges- 
tive, but it is quite consistent with the same elasticities of demand for 
EMS-country exports by the older members of the EC in  1979-85  as 
in the preceding years  1974-78. 
The third problem concerns the issue of misalignment. De Grauwe 
and Verfaille sensibly argue that the benefits of stable terms of trade 
come partly from the avoidance of misalignment. But they focus ex- 
clusively on the benefits coming through political channels. Their mea- 
sure of misalignment in their econometric work is even tailor-made to 
fit  their  political hypothesis.  Whereas in  their general discussion of 
misalignment in section 3.3 (and the accompanying figures 3. I through 
3.7),  misalignment refers  to productivity-adjusted movements  away 
from PPP, in their econometric work they use the term to refer to the 
cumulative value of the previous sorts of movements in one particular 
direction-the  one pointing toward a loss of competitivity. The idea is 
that periods of low competitiveness (relative to average) produce pro- 
tectionist actions that are never canceled during times of higher-than- 
average competitiveness. I have some misgivings about the application 
of this political hypothesis to the trade relations between the members 
of the EC in the same way as to their trade relations with outsiders. 
This would seem to deny the importance of the free-trade rules in the 
EC and the trade-integrating effects of these rules, to which the authors 
otherwise give weight. But mostly  I  wish to emphasize the authors’ 
neglect of the possibility of other effects of misalignment, such as those 103  Exchange Rate and European Monetary System 
suggested in some of the other contributions to this conference volume, 
like the  Baldwin-Krugman argument about fixed costs of entry in a 
foreign market. These other effects would tend to say that a misalign- 
ment damages exports in one direction while encouraging them in the 
opposite one, contrary to De Grauwe and Verfaille’s argument that 
misalignment hurts exports in every direction. This is important since 
it could mean that De Grauwe and Verfaille’s neglect of other effects 
interfered with finding the ones they were looking for. In any event, 
the authors take too limited a view of the possible effects of misalignment. 
The paper would gain considerable interest, in my  opinion, if  these 
problems were repaired or at least given proper attention. The simu- 
lations would benefit too-quite independently of the test significance 
of the estimated parameters, which could remain a problem. But even 
as the paper now  stands, it provides a lot of  food for thought about 
the effects of the EMS. This Page Intentionally Left Blank